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/ISSUES IN THE ONTOLOGY OF FICTION/ 
Thomas G. Pavel 
University of Ottawa 
0. Current work in the semantics of fiction usually starts 
from post-Russellian ontologies in which, according to 
Quine's formula, "to exist is to be the value of a variable". 
The domain where these values are chosen is supposed to be 
the actual universe and its modal counterparts. In order to 
account for the semantics of fiction, some authors are ready 
to accept an extension of this domain, while others appear to 
think that the only real thing about fiction is fictional 
discourse: hence, the speech-act theory of fiction. In this 
paper I will criticize the attempt to ground the theory of 
fiction in a theory of fictional discourse and I will suggest 
an ontological expansion to account for fictional construc-
tions. 
1. A mime enters an empty stage. He greets an invisible per-
son by taking off an invisible hat and putting it back on 
again. Offering a broad smile, he shakes an invisible hand 
and utters a few inaudible words. He then takes the arm of 
his /invisible/ partner and the two companions walk a few 
steps. It is by now clear that the invisible person is a 
woman. The mime smiles gallantly, puts his arm around her 
waist, carasses her hair, whispers a few words of love in her 
ear. His hand becomes more daring but the invisible woman soon 
puts things back in order. They stop and sit on a /visible/ 
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lively. As his partner does not appear to believe him, the 
mime insists, argues, swears, falls to his knees. Still 
timid, she rejects his advances. But soon they embrace. 
Black out. 
There is little doubt that a competent public correct-
ly grasps at least two kinds of facts about the mime's per-
formance: first, that the mime is only pretending to meet, 
talk to or embrace someone, second, that the mime's activi-
ty on the stage can be described as pretending something. 
A naive or unperceptive spectator who believes that the mime 
actually speaks to and kisses shadows is certainly wrong. By 
the same token, a person who, while realizing that the per-
former is only acting,' does not understand what all this com-
ing and going on the stage means, is said to have missed the 
point of the performance. 
Consider now two theorists who want to account for the 
mime's performance. One of them would argue that it is use-
less to look into what exactly the mime pretended to be do-
ing. Did he meet a woman? Did he kiss her? Pointless ques-
tions, since it would be equally awkward to answer "Yes, l)e 
did" or "No, he didn't'.' In this theorist's views, what is 
essential about the mime's show would be precisely the fact 
that is is a piece of acting. 
The second theorist would claim that despite the act-
ing, in order to understand what the show is about, one has 
to correctly interpret each detail of it. For the second the-
orist, the answer to questions like "Did the mime meet a wom-
an?" must be affirmative or negative. Indeed, would argue the 
second theorist, the meaning and the course of the act would 
change completely if at the beginning of the show the mime 
did not meet a woman but a mad dog. 
In answering this, the first theorist may bring into the 
discussion conditions and rules which govern our relations 
with the external world and other minds. Suppose that he es-
tablishes a few rules of appropriateness, asking people to 
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use certain types of behaviour /e.g. talking, kissing/ only 
when interacting with other people, to make certain gestures 
only when handling the appropriate objects,, etc. When checked 
against these rules of "appropriateness", the mime's behav-
iour is clearly spurious. The mime talks to and kisses non-
existing entities, handles non-objects, etc. Therefore, the 
first theorist may argue that the mime's gestures lack the 
appropriateness of their counterparts in acutal life. True, 
the moving of lips and smiling occurs in communicative situa-
tions, but the mimé is not involved in such a situation. Whom 
does he kiss and talk to? No-one, the first theorist would 
answer. It is all a pretense. There is no need to worry a-
bout the woman: she is nothing but the result of "special 
effects" used by the mime. 
But this argument need not convince the second theorist. 
For, it is clear that as the appearance of the woman is the 
result of the mime's industry, it is no less clear that in 
the actj the woman does play a role. 
The first theorist may then add that he does not deny 
the woman's role in the act. All he is trying to show is that 
there are two types of acts: actual actes and pretenses and 
that some entities involved in pretenses do not exist, even 
if we can be brought to a certain kind of perceptual aware-
ness of them. Although we may well believe that a woman is 
kissed by the mime, or rather we may suspend our disbelief 
that-.no woman is there to be kissed by the mime, it remains 
clear that there is no woman there on the stage. The first 
theorist would conclude-by sketching a theory of the public: 
the audience may be said to have internalized a system of 
codes to be used in different.situations. In order to cor-
rectly assess the mime's behaviour all the spectator has to 
do is to switch his system to, say, the code of "pretense" 
or of "artistic fiction". This triggers a modification in 
the spectator's perceptual framework allowing him to see what 
is not there, to hear what is not said, and to correctly in-
- 52 -
fer what is not the case from what is not genuine. Moreover, 
although the system has been switched to "pretense", there 
remain perceptual outlets which work on the "actuality" 
switch. Thus, the spectator knows all along that he is sitt-
ing in a theatre, that "in fact" the woman is not there, 
' that he is more ¿r less willingly suspending his disbelief, 
etc. 
How many positions are on the switch-board? asks the 
second theorist. 
At least two, answers his opponent, but not necessarily 
only two. Systems with more options can be thought of, with 
the important qualification that in each of these systems to 
exist would mean to exist in the basic "actual" option. In 
all the other options existence is a mere illusion. 
Consider, however, another performance by the same mime, 
the second theorist would say. At some point in this perform-
ance, the mime is pretending to be a priest who blesses the 
audience. Is the blessing genuine? Certainly not, as both the 
actor and the audience correctly interpret the setting of the 
act. But think of a few variations on this theme. Consider, 
for example, the case of an unbeliever who attends a mass 
and sees the priest blessing the crowd. The unbeliever as-
sumes that what he sees is either collective delusion or 
plain imposture. In the first alternative the priest is him-
self the victim of an unwarranted belief, in the second, he 
takes advantage of the popular faith. Suppose, moreover, 
that the ritual observed by the priest is assumed to compel 
a certain holy being to descend invisibly upon the heads of 
the attendants. Does this being exist? Not for the unbeliever, 
of course, who disdainfully scorns the popular piety. Nor 
does the holy being exist for a sceptic priest, who vacu-
ously performs che sacred gestures. The crowd nonetheless, 
as well as a sincere minister, knows that the holy being is 
there. But let us consider the impostor priest. He "pre-
tends" to inyoke the holy spirit, while believing that there 
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is no such being. Suppose, in addition, that the ritual in-
volves some manifestation, of deeply felt belief, such as . 
closing the eyes, trembling, sweating, etc. Suppose also that 
the attendants are trained to carefully scrutinize the minis-
ter in order to detect and punish superficial /and hence in-
effectual/ enactments of the rite. The perjured performer of 
the rite has to perform it as "sincerely" as possible, while 
knowing perfectly well that his rapture is fake. But in order 
for his performance to appear genuine, he has to keep his own 
knowledge of the imposture as marginal as possible. In fact, 
he may be said to willingly suspend his disbelief in the epi-
phany of the holy spirit, and enter the performance of the 
rite with his system "switched" to some non-actual option. 
For more common situations similar to the invocation rite, 
think of the innumerable cases of false lovers who willingly 
and perversely suspend their disbelief in the presence of lo-
ve, and simulate all the symptoms of this feeling: palor, 
shyness, blushes, tears, raptures, etc. Some get caught, as 
the simulation of love can sometimes conjure up the feeling 
itself. After repeatedly having lied "I love you," these 
lovers succumb to their own fantasy. To ask whether their 
love exists or not does not make.sense. They would say yes, 
but they also did so when they were only lying. Soon they 
will forget that there was a time when they were not deeply 
in love, just as after their love passes, some will claim 
that it was never there. 
The first theorist would certainly argue that love is 
as elusive as can be and that even if it is not impossible 
to grant love some sort of existence, it would be mistaken 
to give it the status of entity. Hence, the simile between 
the holy being and love does not work: one should not com-
pare entities and states. 
To this the second theorist can reply that in many cul-
tures love has been thought of as an /invisible/ entity which 
takes possession of the body and soul. Contemporary biology 
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and psychology do not subscribe to"a dybbuk-theory of love, 
but neither does modern science approve of invisible holy 
beings. And in any case, we are not talking about science, 
but about pretense. Now, as the previous examples suggest, 
pretense sometimes carries more reality than reality can it-
self provide. To see this better, let us examine again the 
mime's impersonation of a priest. Let us assume that the act 
takes place in a country where, against the general wishes 
of the people, religion has been entirely forbidden by a 
cruel, unscrupulous tyrant. Churches have been closed, 
priests imprisoned and true believers martyred. A well-or-
chestrated campaign against the old faith is launched; among 
other things, every artistic event is preceded by or in-
cludes some anti-religious act. The cultural leaders of the 
country force our mime to include in his repertoire a parody 
of priestly gestures. But suppose that, like the large ma-
jority of the inhabitants, the mime is a deeply religious 
man. Unable to refuse the performing of the blasphemeous act, 
he decides to subtly transform it into an unobtrusive re-
membrance of the mass. Do not forget that the audience has 
been deprived of any sacred ceremony for a long time, so- that 
even an imitation of the precious forbidden gestures can e-
lectrify the public. Moreover, the image of a minister has 
become so venerable in this society without ministers, that 
the spectators instinctively do not pay much attention to the 
parodic sequences of the anti-religious act. But then, in the 
midst of the performance, the mime turns towards the public 
and letting a saintly expression invade his face, he slowly 
and solemnly blesses the crowd. A stream of grace goes through 
the hall. No one present doubts the genuineness of the bless-
ing. Neither do the few censors who supervise the performance; 
indeed, the next day the mime is arrested and executed.1 
Was the blessing a true one? or was it nothing but the 
delusion of a deprived crowd bewitched by a.poor tumbler? If 
the situation is seen as an emergency, then it may be judged 
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according to rules applicable in other similar emergencies. 
The Christian Church, which traditionally concedes baptism 
an essential role in the individual path towards salvation, 
and which jealously keeps for itself the privilege of dis-
tributing it, allows the layman to administer baptism in 
well-defined crisis situations. If new regulations concern-
ing sacraments and blessings were ever made which would take 
into account the social conditions of modern tyrannies, they 
could carefully consider situations in which some rites ac-
quire full force even if the usual conditions for their ef-
fectiveness are not met. Thus, not only could a layman va-
lidly baptize a still-born, in the absence of an ordained 
minister, but he would be equally enabled to felicitously 
pronounce a couple husband and wife in cases when, say, the 
two must depart for concentration camps. 
2. The preceding examples all involve cases where the exist-
ence of some entity of state is not well established. The 
entities or states in question appear to exist according to 
some criteria, while they do not exist according to other 
criteria. Thus, it is not easy to decide whether the invis-
ible woman in the mime's act exists or not, whether a holy 
being descends or not upon a crowd of believers, whether or 
not someone really is in love with someone else. Some of the 
examples equally involve situations where the opposition 
between genuine acts and competences and faked ones' starts 
to blur. On the one hand, the blessing of the crowd by an 2 
impostor priest is not a genuine blessing. On the other 
hand, a juggler can sometimes acquire the competence of a 
priest. There appear thus to be situations in which the pre-
tense of an action becomes the very action. Wouldn't the 
second theorist be justified in surmising that supposedly 
nonexlsting beings, states or properties do posses after all 
some kind of existence? Shouldn't one refrain from too dras-
tic a use of Occam's famous razor in situations where beards 
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should grow? Wouldn't a bit of trimming largely suffice in 
such situations? 
But notice first that the mime's act is not a text made 
up of words and sentences.3 The choice of this type of exam-
ple is deliberate. It is only natural when examining a fic-
tional text to be led to believe that what makes it fiction 
lies somewhere in its linguistic wrapping. Our first the-
orist, who supports the speech-act theory of fiction, would 
claim that fictional discourse embodies a special type of 
speech-act, characterized notably by the /deliberate/ fail-
ure to follow the rules of assertion. Thus, fictional dis-
course would transgress the following usual regulations for 
assertions. Notably the speaker must believe that his utter-
ance is true /the rule of sincerity/. Some theoreticians add 
that the speaker must be prepared to defend the truth of his 
utterance /the rule of argumentation/; the speaker must be 
prepared to accept the consequences of his utterance /the 
4 
rule of consequences/. Since, in a sense, it may appear that 
a story-teller and more generally the originator of a fic-
tional discourse does not believe in the truth of his utter-
ance, nor is he prepared to defend it or to accept its con-
sequences, the speech-act theorist may well claim that for 
fictional discourse the above rules are out of place. 
But is this claim defensible? The second theorist, with 
whom we will side from now on, may find at least three ways 
of attacking it:, by arguing that the above rules cover only 
a minor part of assertive utterances, by casting doubts on 
the notion of speaker or originator in the case of fictional 
discourse, finally by showing that linguistic meaning is on-
ly a subclass of a much wider category. 
To begin with, the above rules for assertion cover only 
a small section of actual assertive utterances. They de-
scribe the behaviour of an ideal speaker whose capabilities 
far exceed those of human being. Thus, in order to follow the 
rule of sincerity a speaker has to be transparent to himself 
- 57 -
with respect to his beliefs. But since his linguistic compe— 
tence enables a speaker to utter an astronomically large 
number of/new/ assertions, in order to follow the rule of 
sincerity the speaker must possess at least two things: a-
set B of propositions he believes in and a machinery able 
to quickly pick up for each assertive utterance of the 
speaker the corresponding proposition belonging to the set B 
of sentences the speaker believes to be true. When the speak-
er utters a sentence, this machine is automatically trigger-
ed:. if the result of its scanning the set B ends success-
fully, the speaker may be said to have been sincere, while 
if the machine fails to find the corresponding sentence in 
B, the speaker has been insincere. 
However, when confronted with real speakers, this mo-
del of sincerity involves serious problems. First,.it is 
highly improbable that real speakers possess anything like 
a set B of propositions that they believe to be true. The 
picture we get from actual situations appears rather to sug-
gest that we more or less believe a limited number of propo-
sitions, while for a large number of propositions we simply 
do not know /in any serious sence of the word/, whether we 
believe them to be true or not. In many cases people assert 
sentences they think they believe, when in fact they adhere 
to these sentences for other reasons than belief. For in-
stance, they may only strongly admire the person whom they 
heard assert these sentences. A speaker A, for example, will 
utter with conviction sentences like: 
/1/ In our riding X is the best candidate. 
in situations where A does not know anything about X, but 
has a friend B who asserted /1/ several times in the most 
convincing tone of voice. Equally often," speaker A may utter 
sentences like: 
/2/ The best vacation spot in Germany is 
Baden-Baden, 
/3/ Under Mao Tze Tung the Chinese people lived 
- 58 -
a free and happy life. 
despite the fact that he has never visited Germany and knows 
nothing about contemporary China. Again, these are his 
friend B's professed opinions and he feels that he has the 
right /and the duty/ to use them as his own. When uttering 
/1/ to /3/, is speaker A sincere? That is, does he believe 
in what he is saying? But what exactly do we mean by "A be-
lieves that utterance a is true?" Do we refer to rational 
belief? To irrational belief? Do we ask the speaker to be-
lieve deeply in the truth of a, or are we prepared to allow 
for a perfunctory assent of the speaker to his own sayings? 
Is the belief supposed to last for a long time, or are we 
satisfied with a belief equal in duration to the utterance 
believed to be true? And if the last alternative is chosen, 
should the belief be simultaneous with the utterance, or may 
it precede and/or follow the assertion? 
These are not spurious questions. Witness the difficul-
ty, in which we so often find ourselves, of discerning 
whether or not we in fact believe in the truth of some of our 
incautious statements. Does speaker A believe sentence /3/ 
to be true? If his life depended on his rejecting /3/, would 
he hesitate a single moment to /sincerely/ retract is? Are 
we not justified in claiming that, rather than believing that 
/3/ is true, A prefers to play with the idea that he believes 
/3/ to be true? Or take the case of a domestic quarrel, dur-
ing -which one of the partners asserts that the other is the 
basest human being ever to have lived on earth. Does the ut-
terer believe this to be true? Probably yes, at least at the 
time of the argument. Or perhaps he believed it a few moments 
before saying it, but when the words were on the tip of his 
tongue, he suddenly realized that the statement sounded 
greatly exaggerated, without, however, his being able to stop 
the already triggered utterance. Or it could be that the 
speaker did not fully believe the words until later in the 
verbal exchange when he saw how right he had been. And so on. 
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Thus far we have examined only examples of evaluative 
assertions. When factual assertions are considered, the 
sincerity requirement appears even more out of place. Sup-
pose that speaker A says: 
/4/ President Kennedy's murder was by 
Castro's orders. 
/5/ The chemical composition of water is 
/4/ is a controversial statement which A has probably read 
in some newspaper or heard in a conversation with, say, his 
vocal friend B. The sincerity of A in uttering /4/ depends 
less on his own genuine belief that /4/ is the case than on 
his tuning in to. the circulation of statements around him. 
Confronted with the pressing question "Do you really believe 
this?", A may well answer "I dont't know. Many people say 
that" or "It's in the papers" or "They said so on T.V." 
Such sincerity by participation in a group is even 
clearer in the case of the uncontroversial statement /5/. As 
has been pointed out by Putnam, a given community collec-
tively masters its own language and its relation with real-
ity. It may well be that as an individual a member of the 
community is not well acquainted with the full meaning of 
terms like elm, gnosis, or werewolf. One can employ such 
terms, however, by virtue of the social division of linguis-
tic labour. An ignoramous may refer to elm, gnosis or were-
wolves on the assumption that in the community there are 
specialists in elms, gnosis and werewolves who could provide 
all the information necessary should the need arise for a 
closer scrutinizing of the statements about elms, gnosis or 
werewolves. Similarly, speaker A can utter /5/ as carelessly 
as he wishes, without ever bothering to check whether he be-
lieves it to be true or not, since in uttering /5/, he can 
count on the testimony of innumerable chemists who know /5/ 
to be true. And more important, perhaps, he can rest on the 
firm support of an entire educational and academic apparatus 
strongly sanctioned by his society. To assert that the chem-
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ical composition of wather is 1^0 has less need of sincere 
belief in the truth of the statement than epistemological 
adherence to a given society. 
What has been said about sincerity applies all the 
more to the rules of argumentation and consequence. As the 
imago of a speaker capable of finding out whether or not he 
believes what he says appears to be rather unrealistic, how 
can one ask such unreliable speakers to defend the truth of 
their utterances or to accept their consequences? Speakers 
who are ninoere by participation should not be expected to 
defend the truth of their utterances other than by reference 
to the community /"I don't know; my friends told me that," 
"It's in the newspapers," etc./, nor to readily accept the 
consequences of what they say /"How should I have known that 
saying 'X is a good leader' entails endorsing concentration 
camps?"/. Accordingly we have to reject the claim that fic-
tional discourse differs from assertive discourse by the sus-
pension in the former of rules of assertion in force in the 
latter. It appears, indeed, that in many cases the rules of 
assertion are far from being in force in assertive discourse 
itself. The application of these rules can be construed ei-
ther as a normative idealization /corresponding probably to 
a more or loss circumscribed attitude towards the ethics of 
language/, or as applying only to a few marginal cases, such 
as the assertions of people such as geniuses or saints who 
control exceptionally well the beliefs they share. 
The above considerations suggest that qualities such as 
sincerity, ability to argue about assertions, and readiness 
to accept their consequences are far from being individually 
possessed by speakers. In many cases the individual speakers 
behave as if their personal linguistic duties had somehow 
waivered. They need not scrupulously perform these duties, 
since at every failure to do so the community is there to 
cover for them. But if this is so, the very notion of the 
speaker as the originator and master of his own utterances 
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becomes suspect. When our speaker A irresponsibly carries 
over the assertions of his friend B, may he be said to be' 
the speaker? Or, if we still want to qualify him as a speak-
er, should we not defuse some of the connotations of the 
term? 
The contemporary notion of an ideal speaker in total 
command of his linguistic competence, knowing the syntax, the 
meaning of words, the speech-act rules, controlling his be-
liefs and his expectations, seems to be a modern offshoot 
of the cartesian subject, that motionless master of an inner 
space entirely under his own control. But when seen as a 
member of a social group that largely covers for his utter-
ances, the individual speaker appears to be much less dis-
tinctively in charge of his discourse than the cartesian 
tradition maintains. 
In any case, there are few areas where the cartesian 
notion of sueject-speaker is more out of place than in rela-
tion to literary fiction. For, indeed, who is the speaker 
uttering a folk-tale? The raconteur narrating a token of the 
tale? But is the raconteur more than an occasional speaker 
who happens to utter the tale on this particular time? Aren't 
his chances of success increased as he smoothly enters the 
more formalized role of a tale-teller, as he so to speak lets 
the tale speak itself through his mouth? While dealing with 
speech-acts we are tempted to neglect the persistent testi-
mony of story-tellers, bards, poets and writers, who so often 
mention a vicarious speech experience as one of the central 
aspects of poetic acts. The muse may have become a worn-out 
symbol, more often ridiculed than actually used. Reference 
to the muse is, nonetheless, far from spurious. Like the 
prophet's reference to his god, the poet's reliance on the 
muse, on inspiration, on the dictation of the sub-conscious, 
etc., is precisely a way of mentioning this particular type 
of speech experience, in which the speaker is "spoken 
through," as it were, by a voice which is not exactly his 
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own. Who is the originator of the literary utterance? Does 
it make sense at all to look for a "speaker"? 
3. The absence of an individuated speaker does not mean that 
no speech-act can ever be performed. Take promises, for in-
stance. There can be anonymous promises, or unclear promises, 
or promises implicit in the behaviour of a group of persons. 
Thus, the group of young ladies met by the narrator of "Re-
membrance of things past" on the Balbec beach did not perform 
an explicit speech-act when promising Marcel happiness. This 
was an implicit promise, deducible from the care-free ap-
perance of the band, from their youth, from myriad details 
out of which the narrator gathers the resulting message: 
promise of happiness. The same thing can be said about warn-
ings, denouncing, even assertion. For every speech-act with 
a well individuated originator, it is possible to find its 
"vague" equivalent, consisting of fuzzy communication con-
veyed by imperfect means, sometimes without any use of natu-
ral language, often without a clear originator. Let us call 
these "vague" equivalents of speech-acts messages. In the 
acceptation used here, natural events can carry messages as 
well. Dark clouds may be interpreted as a warning, a fresh 
morning as an exhortation, etc. That these are only anthro-
pocentric interpretations of events which lack meaning is not 
important here. The fact is that the human species sees mes-
sages in many natural events and that linguistic and para-
linguistic behaviour is only a narrow, specialized type of 
message-carrying activity. Speech-acts are only the tip of a 
huge non-linguistic iceberg: linguistic promises, warnings, 
assertions, etc. are but a subset of the mass of messages 
that surround us. 
Now, if instead of speech-acts, we direct our attention 
towards messages, we can see that fictional discourse in-
cludes a large number of the latter. More generally all types 
of fiction, literary or non-literary, are replete with mes-
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sages. 
An interesting aspect of seeing speech-acts as a subset 
of the more general class of messages is that in this way we 
can dispense with the so—called principle of expressibility. 
While it may be strategically important for the theoretician 
of linguistic acts to postulate that any content is linguis-
tically expressible, once the notion of message has been ex-
tended to include non-linguistic sings and signals, the prin-
ciple of linguistic expressibility is no longer needed. In-
deed, why should we assume that the class of messages is ex-
pressible in one of its sub-classes, namely the set of lin-
guistic messages? Think of physiognomic expressions. Are all 
of them translatable in linguistic terms? The mixed feelings 
which can be instantly grasped on a face like Chaplin's in 
the last frames of City Lights are not necessarily expres-
sible in our everyday language. The same point can be made 
about musical moods. Are the moods of any Beethoven piano 
sonatas or Mahler's symphonies translatable into words? 
Nonetheless, each section of these sonatas or symphonies can 
be said to convey a certain message. But arent's music lovers 
correct in reacting inpatiently when pedestrian critics 
translate these messages into trivial statements about, say, 
suffering, hope, heroism, and so on? Such statements essen-
tially miss the linguistic inexpressibility of musical mes-
sages . 
- To recapitulate, we have seen that genuine speech-acts 
are only a minority of linguistic utterances, that conse-
quently the notion of speaker or originator implied by 
speech-act theory should not be accepted as such, and that 
linguistic meaning is only a sub-class of a much wider cate-
gory, which we called messages. All this points towards a 
rejection of the so-called 'speech-act' theory of fictional 
discourse. But this means that in order to understand how 
fiction /and perhaps literature/ works, one should not shun 
models involving nonexisting entities, states or properties. 
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4. Let us turn back to our mine. How does he manage 
to attract our attention? How does he lead us to interpret 
his gestures correctly and to posit next to him the imagi-
nary presence of a woman? 
The public's attention is directed towards the mime by 
a score of conventional elements. An artistic production is 
a special happening carefully isolated from other activities, 
usually taking place in a hall reserved for artistic events, 
on a stage situated in such a way as to constitute the focal 
point of the hall. The beginning of the show is marked by a 
gong, by music, by the dimming of lights, by the raising of 
the curtain, etc. But more fundamental than these conven-
tional ways of channeling attention is the /trivial/ fact 
that events which potentially carry messages recommend them-
selves to the attention in a natural fashion. One stops to 
see a car accident, one turns his head to better see two 
people arguing in the street, or an interesting physiognomy, 
or an elegant dress. Much of our daily activity /trivially/ 
consists of message detecting and decoding. 
Now, a general characteristic of messages is their in-
completeness. It suffices to notice a slowdown of highway 
traffic and the distant flashing of police car lights in or-
der to understand the message: "car accident." A spark of 
hostility in a colleague's eye is enough to warn us that he 
/she doesn't agree with our ideas. The expression on the face 
of avpassing woman may be all we need in order to feel that 
she is the only human being capable of loving us /Baudelaire, 
A une passanteI. In no situation are we offered complete in-
formation on the state of affairs taking place. All we have 
access to are a few factual clues, from which we are "pro-
grammed to infer a general message. The programming may be 
biological or cultural. In deriving configurations and mes-
sages from clues we have a bias towards an anthropological 
or at least animistic interpretation. Cultural specifications 
may be added at will, as well as individual idiosyncrasies. 
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Accordingly, a basic fact of our understanding of the 
environment in which we live, is that an individual belong-
ing to the human species, born and raised in a given culture, 
must be capable of integrating the incomplete perceptual 
clues with which he is constantly faced into coherent pic-
tures of states of affairs. In order to represent this capa-
bility, a theoretical model is needed, a model which shows 
how the individual constructs configurations out of facts. 
Whatever form the model takes, it will include some ability 
of hypothetically positing worlds in which the factual 
clues are included. Constructing worlds obeys different sets 
of rules which are both biologically and culturally deter-
mined. But basically all world positing involves the posit-
ing of individuals whose presence may be only an indirect 
result of the processing of factual clues. In other words, 
a model of our understanding of the environment must contain 
some device for positing individuals whose actual existence 
is unwarranted. The same reasoning applies to states, prop-
erties, acts, and so on. Not unlike the familiar Popperian 
scheme, tested /as opposed to unwarranted/ existence is ob-
tained by checking the posited individuals, states, proper-
ties, etc. against some accepted battery of criteria, such 
as. authority, personal experience or intersubjective obser-
vation. 
Notice that the process described above is independent 
of the philosophical dispute between realism and antireal-
ism. An Anti-realist can take the positing-checking scheme 
as involving unwarranted versus Warranted assertibility 
/Dewey/, while a realist may see the scheme relating hy-
potheses and their partial confirmation, as a way of indefi-
nitely approaching an actual world. 
Now, if clue-processing and positing unwarranted 
worlds, individuals, states, and properties is a fundamental 
way of taking our environment into account, to posit the 
existence of an invisible woman next to our mime has nothing 
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special about it. Her Meinongian existence simply fails to 
result in actual existence after further checking is com-
pleted. But such was already the case with all Greek gods, 
with phlogiston and with ether. 
5. From what has been said, it appears that in order to 
function epistemologically, human beings and presumably human 
communities as well, have to develop at least two abilities. 
On the one hand they should be capable of positing various 
worlds, individuals, states, etc. On the other, they should 
develop techniques for controlling these worlds and checking 
them in actuality. In order for the barber who handles 
Occam's razor to be able to make a living there must be a 
great deal of beard-growing. Or, to put it otherwise, actual 
ontology is but a particular case of Meinongian und ultra-
Meinongian ontologies. 
However, if there is nothing special about the mime's 
girl friend, how can the difference between fiction and non-
fiction be captured? We saw that this difference is not be 
found at the level of discourse. In what follows we will ex-
amine the possibility of explaining the difference between 
fiction and non-fiction and non^fiction at the level of ontol-
ogies. We will contrast mono-level and multi-level ontol-
ogies, plain and special ontologies, and ludic and non-ludic 
uses of ontologies. 
Consider the following model. An ontology 0 is defined 
as an ordered pair /K,F/ made up of a cosmos K and an ontic 
foundation F. The definition of the cosmos closely follows 
that of model structures. A cosmos K is an ordered triple 
containing a non-null set C of worlds, a world W belonging 
to C and given as the actual world and a binary relation A 
on C, the relation of accessibility. A world I belonging to 
C is defined as a pair /D^T /, constituted of a domain Dx 
of entities which exist in I and of a set Tj of sentences 
true in the world I. Depending on the constraints on D_ and 
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Tj, we can include in the description of the world I such 
elements as properties, stages, events, acts, sensations,-
perceptions, values, etc. The ontic foundation F of an on-
tology 0 contains a set N of elements and a set M of func-
tions, the ontic functions, which take as their domain mem-
bers or ordered n-tuples of members of UD^. where I eC, and 
as their values members or ordered rc-tuples of members of N. 
According to this definition, it is possible to match a giv-
en ontic foundation with more than one cosmos and vice-versa. 
It is possible as well that a cosmos K belonging to a given 
ontology serves as the ontic foundation of another ontol-
ogy 0 2, in the sense that the set UD^ of entities to be 
found in the worlds of the cosmos K, or some subset of UD^, 
serves as the set N of elements of the ontic foundation of 
the second ontology 0 2. 
An example will show what is meant by this construction. 
Let us consider a fragment of a cosmos K^ belonging to the 
ontology made up of two worlds W^ and W2. W^ is the ac-
tual world of this cosmos. We concentrate upon a sub-domain 
of W^, consisting of three individuals a, b, and a as well 
as upon some of the true sentences about these individuals. 
Assume that among these sentences one can find statements 
which characterize a, b, and a human beings, assign them 
proper names, a gender, a national and social status, etc. 
Suppose moreover that b and a are respectively the mother 
and '-father of a in W^ as well as in all worlds of the cosmos 
Kp. In most of these worlds and particularly in W^ and W 2, 
a is a religious prophet who preaches the near coming of the 
end. The difference between W^ and W 2 consists in that while 
in Wj^ the actual world of Kp, a becomes a martyr, in W 2 he 
dies of sickness shortly after being tried and acquitted. 
Suppose now that these elements of K^ serve as the ontic 
foundation of a second ontology 0 2 - /Kg, Fs/. The ontic 
foundation F is made up of a set of elements, among which s 
a, b and a are included, and of a set of relations. One of 
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these is the identification relation which associates some 
or all entities belonging to the new cosmos K s with one and 
only one element of the set F^. Let us suppose that among 
the entities of Ks, there are the elements g, d, e, f. Among 
the true sentences in the world W which is actual in K , s s 
there are sentences asserting that g is God, d is his son, 
e is the mother of d and f is the husband of e and protector 
of d. The identification relation contains the pairs /a,d/, 
/h,e/, /e,//. This amounts to saying that he who in is a 
religious prophet, in.Kg is the son of God, his mother, in 
K is his mother in K as well, while his father in K be-
P s p 
comes in Kg his protector. The ontic foundation should also 
contain a relation of correspondence, which matches rela-
tions in Kp. For instance, to the relation father of /o,a/ 
in W^ eKp, the correspondence relation associates father of 
/g,d/ in W s e Ks. 
It should be clear that this two-level ontological con-
struction is designed to represent the contrast most soci-
I 
eties make between the sacred and the profane. Indeed, ac-
cording to the classical analyses of Mircea Eliade, the 
religious mind divides the universe into two regions quali-
tatively different. Space, time, and more generally the whole 
ontology divides along the sacred-profane distinction. The 
religious mind needs two different frames of reference, in-
dependent of one another, yet intimately interconnected. The 
KwaKiutl neophyte who shouts "I am in the Center of the 
World!" while being in the cult house next to the sacred pole, 
does not deny the profane reality of the pole; he only as-
serts the establishing of a sacred ontology, in which the 
pole becomes the Center of the World. Similarly, the Chris-
tian who asserts the divine nature of the Cris-t is using a 
sacred ontology having as its ontic foundation the profane 
ontology containing Jesus as a human being. 
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Multi-level ontologies are not in principle restricted 
to the sacred/profane opposition, nor to having at most two 
levels. Philosophers of science who oppose reductionism and 
believe in such notions as level-independence and emergence 
/Bunge, Polanyi/, may need a larger number of ontological 
levels. The point I wish to make here is that, besides their 
use by the religious mind, two-level ontologies typically 
serve artistic fiction. The mime's body and movements as they 
exist in the actual world serve as part of the ontic founda-
tion in a second ontology in which he is the timid lover 
courting the /invisible in the first ontology/ woman. If so, 
we are prepared to understand why it is false to claim that 
"in Little Red Riding Hood both ... 'red' means red and yet 
... the rules correlating 'red' with red are not in force" 
/Searle/. What happens in fact is that the rules correlating 
"red"-in-the-second-ontology with red-in-the-first-ontology 
are a bit more complex than the rules relating "red" with 
red in the first ontology. Indeed, as the first ontology 
serves as the ontic foundation of the fictional ontology, 
"red"-in-02 is matched with red-in-O^ via the ontic relations. 
It is clear, however, from the way we define these relations, 
that nothing forces us to relate "red"-in-02 to red-in-O^. 
The writer of fiction can always fabricate a story about a 
land where red was in fact green. But he will choose to do 
so only rarely, probably because in order to be manageable, 
secondary ontologies have to respect as much as possible the 
inner structure of the primary ontologies they use as their 
ontic foundation. 
A further distinction of some interest for our topic is 
that between plain and special ontologies. This distinction 
is meant to account for the contrast between plain existence 
and special kinds of existence. Again, this contrast is best 
seen in the ontology of the sacred, where the absolute 
reality of the sacred is crucially opposed to the plain ex-
istence oi the profane. Sacred beings not only obey other 
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laws than sublunar creatures, but their way of being is 
fundamentally different /according to R. Otto's formula/-. 
Christian theology, which reflected at length on this aspect 
of sacred ontology, arrived at the theory of the analogy of 
being„ according to which most or all predications, espe-
cially those involving the verbs to be or to exist, are only 
analogically asserted of God and of his creatures. God's 
existence and being belong to a special ontology. Fictional 
constructions may be said to involve special ontologies as 
well, ontologies in which being and existence are only ana-
logically similar to the same notions in plain ontologies. 
Without entering into the details of this hypothesis, it may 
well be that the main difference between plain and special 
ontologies lie in the status of existence; while in plain 
ontologies the Russellian explanation of the notion of ex-
istence in terms of variables and their values is in force, 
in special ontologies existence could still be a predicate, 
probably a predicate the content of which greatly varies from 
one special ontology to another. 
Finally, if both sacred and fictional beings belong to 
special ontologies, what distinguishes them? For despite the 
frequent identification of myth with fiction, it must be point-
ed out that for their users, nothing could be farther apart 
than myth which have "absolute authority" /Eliade/, and mere 
fictions. Like any other element of the accepted ontology, 
myths can be employed in fiction for as long as the public 
believes in them. When they are no longer in force, myths 
globally become fiction, or rather they start to be used as 
fiction. What seems to distinguish myth from its fictional 
uses is the ludic character of fiction. Theoreticians of lu-
dic activities agree to a few common characteristics to be 
found in most of these: the free character of games, their 
separation from the rest of time and space, the uncertainty 
of their outcome, their unproductivity , their being governed 
by rules, their fictional character.6 Clearly, as opposed to 
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belief in the myths of the community, which is in most cases 
compulsory, assent to fiction is free and clearly oircum-
aribed in time and space. Myths are all supposedly fixed' in 
advance and true forever, while new fictional constructions 
are always possible. Fiction is moreover governed by rules 
and conventions, and is /trivially/ fictional. The implica-
tions of the ludic use on the structure of fictional ontolo-
gies remains to be explored. 
To conclude, we have seen that speech-act orinted 
theories of fictional discourse are inadequate. Fictional 
discourse should be seen as part of a more general class, 
that of fictional constructions. In order to understand fic-
tion, one needs a strong ontological apparatus. Based on 
multi-level ontologies, fiction involves special ontologies 
and it differs from sacred ontologies in that its main use 
is ludic. Complex as they may seem, These ontologies could 
provide a non-reductionist and flexible basis for the seman-
tics of fictional constructions. 
Notes 
1 One presumably has recognized in this apologue an updated 
version of Rotrou's tragedy Saint-Genest, aomedien et 
martyvo. 
Incidentally, medieval philosophers were disturbed by the 
possible conflict between the social aspect of a rite and 
its secret effectiveness. According to Saint Bonaventure, 
a priest who celebrates the mass while in a state of sin 
does not have the power to perform the transsubstantiation. 
This entails the frightful consequence that a layman who 
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attends the mass officiated by the bad priest is in fact 
deprived of the benefit of it. If this answer appears to 
be a bit severe, let us think of a dying man who confesses 
his sins to and receives the last sacraments from an un-
ordained impostor. Will the dying man be saved or damned? 
If the answer is "saved," why is it then necessary to main-
tain the conditions on genuineness and appropriateness of 
rites? (But then, what would the rites be, if genuineness 
and appropriateness are taken away from them?) If the as-
swer is "damned," think that the impostor could later re-
pent, confess to a genuine priest and thus be saved, and 
what, then, becomes of. divine-justice? 
3 
In any case, not if by text we mean "a coherent sequence 
of sentences." As the term text sells quite well nowadays, 
it is not unlikely that someone has either already spoken 
or will speak of the 'text of pantomime', just as so many 
writers refer to the 'text of a dance', the 'text of a 
society' or even to the 'text of a city'. But these are, 
of course, metaphorical uses of the term. 
^ These rules are argued for in G. Gabriel, "Fiction-- a 
semantic approach." in Poetics 8 (.1979), p. 249. J. Searle, 
in' "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," New Liter-
ary History 7 (.1975), pp. 319-32, uses only the sincerity 
rule. 
5 
By ultra-Meinongian ontology is understood an ontology con-
taining beings about which it is impossible to speak ade-
quately. 
6 R. Caillois, Lea jeux e't les hommes, Paris:. Gallimard, 1967, 
pp. 42-43. 
(Paper presented at the working group on Reference in Fic-
tional Texts 1979) 
